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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1955
The articles of this survey have been prepared for publication as a
part of the nominee program for membership on the Washington Law
Review. The actual writing was done by the second-year members of
the Law Review, under the guidance of the third-year members of the
Board. The survey, the third of its kind, does not represent an attempt
to discuss every Washington case decided in 1955. Rather, its purpose
is to point out those cases which, in the opinion of the Board of Editors,
constitute substantial additions to the body of law in Washington.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Requirement that Justices of the Peace be Attorneys. After two
unsuccessful attempts to get a ruling on the constitutionality of Chapter
74, P. 210 and Chapter 156 § 2, P. 430, Laws of 1951,' which provide
that justices of the peace in cities of over 5,000 population shall be
attorneys at law, the court in In re Bartz2 held that the law is not in
conflict with article III, section 25 of the Washington State Constitution. The first attempt at a ruling, Bullock v. Stone,' was an appeal
from a denial in a lower court of a writ of prohibition to prevent a
county auditor from placing on the ballot the name of a non-lawyer
candidate for the office of justice of the peace in a city of over 5,000
population, and to restrain the county canvassing board from canvassing votes cast in his behalf. To uphold the lower court would have
meant denying the constitutionality of the act, and the department
I RCW

3.12.071.
147 Wash. Dec. 145, 287 P2d 119 (1955).
3 45 Wn.2d 891, 273 P.2d 892 (1955), cert. dedied 45 Wn.2d 892, 279 P2d 439 (1955).
2
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of the court which heard the case, not being in unanimous agreement,
felt this should be done, if at all, en banc. The case was scheduled for
a hearing before the whole court, but before the case came up the nonlawyer candidate was defeated at the polls, thereby making the problem
4
moot. In the second attempt, Kitsap County v. City of Bremerton,
the problem was not passed on for want of jurisdiction. Even though
the defendant did not question the standing of the complainant to sue,
the court declared that in all cases involving the constitutionality of a
statute, the standing of the parties to sue would be carefully scrutinized.' The county was standing on the ground that it was an injured
party under that portion of the law which required it to pay more
money to justices of the peace.' The court rejected the contention of
the county, and held that the county was a mere political subdivision
of the state, derived its power from the state, could not question the
will of the state to spend money collected under the power granted by
the state, and therefore did not have standing to sue.
The third attempt, In re Bartz, was an action brought by a citizen
of Chehalis to restrain a non-lawyer justice of the peace who was
elected after passage of the act from performing the duties of his
office. The argument for declaring the act unconstitutional was that
article III, section 25 provides qualifications for state officers, impliedly
prohibiting imposition of further qualifications, that justices of the
peace are state officers, and that therefore the imposition of further
qualifications for the office is unconstitutional. Noting that there is
some question as to whether or not a general qualification in a constitution prohibits imposition of additional qualifications, but assuming
the better rule to be that it does, the court held that justices of the peace
are not state officers within the meaning of article III, section 25, but
are judicial officers, and that since no other clause imposes qualifications, the legislature is free to impose such qualifications as it sees fit.'
In the Bartz case, the court relied on the grammatical construction
4

46 Wn.2d 362, 281 P.2d 841 (1955).
see Nacarrato v. Sullivan, 46 XVn.2d 67, 278 P.2d 641 (1955), wherein neither
the opinion of the court nor the briefs of the parties revealed the standing of the complainant to sue, although the complainant was challenging constitutionality of a statute.
In any event, the Kitsap County case gives fair warning to attorneys in this state to be
on firm ground as far as standing is concerned before bringing a case involving constitutional problems.
6Chapter 156, §4, Laws of 1951, (RCW 3.16.004).
7 147 Wash. Dec. 145, 287 P.2d 119 (1955).
8 The state constitution is a limitation, not a grant, of powers. Union High School
District No. 1, Skagit County v. Taxpayers of Union High School District No. 1,
Skagit County, 26 Wn.2d 1, 172 P.2d 591 (1946).
5 But
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of article V, section 2,0 and article IV, section 3,"0 to provide proof of
intent of the drafters of the Washington State Constitution to differentiate between state officers and judicial officers, although why this
sort of reasoning would not apply to prior cases which have held
members of the judiciary to be state officers is not clear. The court has
held that superior court judges are," and are not,"2 state officers within
the meaning of article IV, section 4, which provides for original jurisdiction on writs of mandamus as to state officers. It has held that
superior court judges are state officers within the meaning of article VI,
section 8 providing for election of state officers not provided for elsewhere in the constitution, 3 but that justices of the peace are not
county officers within the meaning of that section. 4 It would thus
seem that the intent of the drafters of our state constitution to differentiate between state and judicial officers is not entirely determinative
of the problem.
The court also notes that article III, section 25 provides that there
shall be no salary increase for state officers for the term for which they
shall have been elected, and that a similar provision pertaining to
judicial officers is found in article IV, section 13. Reasoning that the
latter section would have been unnecessary if judicial officers were
state officers, they find that article III, section 25 could not have been
intended by the drafters of the constitution to apply to judicial officers.
Interestingly enough, article IV, section 13 provides only that there
shall be no increase in compensation during term in office, while article
III, section 25 provides that there shall be no increase or decrease;
hence it could be argued that the legislature has the power to decrease
compensation of supreme court and superior court judges during
the term for which those officials were elected.' This would seem
0 "The Governor and other state and judicial officers. .. " If the intent of the constitutional drafters had been to include judicial within the term "state officers" the addition
of the words "and judicial officers" would have been unnecessary.
10 "The judges of the supreme court shall be elected ... at the times and places at
which state officers are elected... ." If the intent of the constitutional drafters had been
to include supreme court judges within the term "state officers" the phrase should read
.. at the times and places at which other state officers are elected...."
State ex reL. Edelstein v. Foley, 6 Wn.2d 444, 107 P.2d 901 (1940).
12 State cx tel. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hem, 106 Wash. 362, 180 Pac. 400 (1919).
13 State cx rel. Dyer v. Twitchell, 4 Wash. 715, 31 Pac. 19 (1892).
14 State ex rel. Fair v. Hamilton, 92 Wash. 347, 159 Pac. 379 (1916), wherein it was
also held that justices of the peace are not county officers within the meaning of art. XI,
§4 and §5, which provides for uniform organization of county government and uniform
election of county officers. But see amendment 21, wherein the legislature prescribes for
election and authority of county officers, and specifically excepts justices of the peace
and superior court judges from the effects of the clause, inferentially showing that the
legislature considers them to be county officers.
15 The out for the court if such a case came up might be found in the language of art.
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an unusual power to leave in the legislature, under traditional
notions of separation of and independence of the judiciary from
the legislative branch of the government.1 The problem becomes
even more confusing with the introduction of the decision in City
7 which held that justices of the peace come
of Everett v. Johnson,"
within the provisions of article II, section 25, which provides the same
restrictions on alteration of wages of public officers during the term
for which they are elected that article III, section 25 does for state
officers. Using the same line of reasoning as that employed in In re
Bartz,8 superior court and supreme court justices are not public officers
within the meaning of article II, section 25 because otherwise that
portion of article IV, section 13 which proscribes alteration of salaries
would be a redundancy. Since the court held in the Everett case that
justices of the peace are public officers within the meaning of article II,
section 25, one of three conclusions must follow: (1) that justices of
the peace are not judicial officers in the same sense that superior or
supreme court justices are; (2) that the reasoning that the court uses
in the Bartz case is faulty or is restricted to the peculiar facts of the
case; or (3) that the decision in the Everett case is impliedly disapproved by the reasoning in the Bartz case. Since the first conclusion
would destroy the effect of the whole argument in the Bartz case, one
of the latter two conclusions must follow.
In any event perhaps the most that can be said on this subject is that
aside from those sections of the constitution which have been spefically interpreted (and perhaps even in those), supreme court justices,
superior court justices, and justices of the peace are judicial officers
for most purposes, but that they are sometimes included within the
terms "state officers" and/or "public officers" (and perhaps "county
officers"). The use of those terms does not necessarily include or
exclude the judiciary and it would be well for any attorney relying on
an interpretation either way to have his arguments for his interpretation
well marshalled.
IV, §14. Since that section provides that the legislature may increase salaries of supreme
and superior court justices, the argument could be made that the section impliedly prohibits decrease of compensation. Such a holding would of course mean that should
the state ever fall into economic hardship, the legislature would be without power
under the constitution to decrease compensation to supreme and superior court justices.
Such a holding would also have to be made in conflict with the well established rule
that the state constitution is a limitation, not a grant, of powers. See note 8, supra.

16 Compare art. III, §1 of the United States Constitution, which provides that the
compensation of the judiciary shall not be diminished during continuance in office.
2737 Wn2d 505, 224 P2d 617 (1951).
18 147 Wash. Dec. 145, 287 P.2d 119 (1955).
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The Frasch Fish Case. In Frasch v. Sckoettler 9 the court held inter
alia that the powers delegated to the Director of Fisheries under Chapter 147, Laws of 195320 were not void as a delegation of legislative powers. That law provides for licensing of boats and fishermen fishing
outside of the three mile limit and transporting their catch through or
into the waters of this state. It also provides for the establishment of
closed seasons in certain areas. The Frasch case involved an appeal by
132 fishermen from a lower court ruling which denied an injunction
against the Director of Fisheries to restrain him from enforcing rules
and regulations promulgated by him pursuant to the challenged
law, and which denied a declaratory judgment that the law was unconstitutional.
The Washington State Constitution provides that the power to make
laws shall be vested in the legislature, or in the people by the method
of referendum or initiative. 21 Two established qualifications to this
provision are that the legislature may delegate power to an agency to
ascertain the existence of facts on whose existence the law will begin
to operate,12 or may delegate power to promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out an express legislative purpose," provided a sufficiently
definite standard is set out to guide and limit the agency to which
the power is delegated. The problem is, what is a sufficiently definite
standard? Apparently the standard required varies considerably from
case to case, and what would be a sufficient standard in one situation
will not suffice in another. Among the factors which determine whether
or not a standard is sufficiently definite are considerations of how easy
it would be for the legislature to provide a workable standard for the
agency 2 and whether the subject matter regulated by the law deals
only with a privilege which the state is free to withdraw completely at
any time or with an established personal or property right.2
The standards set out for the Director of Fisheries under the challenged law are to be found, if at all, in section 1 of that law,26 which
section sets out the purpose of the act, i.e., to preserve the salmon
industry. With this general purpose his only limitation, the Director

10 46 Wn2d 281,
20

2

280 P2d 1038 (1955).
RCW 75.18.070-.080.

1 Art. 2, §1 as amended.

22 Cawsey v. Brickey, 82 WVash. 653, 144 Pac. 938 (1914). See 11 Am.

JUR.,

Constitit-

Law §235 (1937).
tionzaI
23 Senior Citizens League v. Dept.
of Social Security, 38 Wn.2d 142, 228 P.2d 478
(1951). See 11 Am. JUR., ConstitutionalLaw §240 (1937).
.4 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

20 RCW 75.18.005.
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has been delegated a somewhat more extensive power than that
provided by former fisheries laws. He has the power to change
opening and closing dates in accordance with his judgment"7 and
to revoke licenses if it appears to him that operations under such
licenses will tend to result in impairment, depletion, or destruction of
the salmon resources of the state." The first power mentioned is an
extension from that granted to the Director under the general fisheries
statute, RCW 75.12.010, since that statute states that the Director can
only shorten the fishing season from that provided by the legislature,
while under the provisions of the statute challenged in the Frasck case,
presumably he can lengthen, shorten, or even change the general
period of the year during which fishing is allowed. The power to revoke
licenses is even more unusual, not only because the Director has heretofore lacked such power under other fisheries statutes, -" but also because
ordinarily a law that provides for revocation of a license by an administrative official is void unless very clear guides are provided within
the statute granting that authority."
In upholding the constitutionality of the questioned law as far as
the delegation of authority problem was concerned, the court in the
Frasch case relied principally on two cases: Vail v. Seaborg,l and
McMillan v. Sinms. 2

These cases dealt with statutes involving the

same subject matter as that in the Fraschcase, i.e., regulation of fishing,
and both of those cases cited an earlier case, Cawsey v. Brickey,M which
held constitutional a delegation of authority to a Board of County Commissioners to determine the best area within the county for a game
preserve. This was essentially a delegation of authority to find a fact
upon which the particular game conservation law began to operate.
From this simple beginning, the court in the Vail and McMillan cases
held that the Board of Fisheries could be constitutionally delegated
27

28

RCW 75.18.070.

RCW 75.18.080.

29 RCW 75.28.380 provides that only upon conviction of a violation of the fishing
laws set out in Title 75 may a judge or justice of the peace who hears the case revoke
the license of the convicted individual. A mandatory revocation is provided for a second
conviction. The Director under this section has only the power to refuse to re-issue
the license after revocation.
30 Cf. State ex rel. Makis v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 296, 193 Pac. 845, 12 A.L.R.
1248 (1920), wherein a soft drink manufacturer's license was revoked by an agency
official under a law giving that official such power if he felt that operation of the
business under the license was against "preservation of public morality, peace, health
or good order." The law was declared unconstitutional for lack of an adequate
standard.
31 120 Wash. 126, 207 Pac. 15 (1922).
^2 132 Wash. 265, 231 Pac. 943 (1925).
33 82 Wash. 653, 144 Pac. 938 (1914).
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power to promulgate rules and regulations concerning where, when
and in what manner fish could be taken from the waters of the state,
and that such a delegation is adequately supported by only a statement
of legislative policy of game preservation as a standard.
It is not clear whether the court now looks upon delegation of powers
under fish and game laws as primarily a fact-finding power, as was
the case in Cawsey v. Brickey,3 4 or power to promulgate rules and regulations, as in Vail v. Seaborg. It seems doubtful, however, that the
court's characterization in the Frasch case of such powers as those
granted under RCW 75.18.070 and .080 as "simply ministerial" is
accurate, since a ministerial duty is usually defined as one involving
little or no discretion." This is certainly not the nature of the power
granted to the Director of Fisheries under the challenged law.
Strong dissents in both Vail v. Seaborg," and McMillan v. Simms,"
voiced disapproval of the trend that the dissenting justices felt was
being taken from a republican to a bureaucratic form of government,
and those dissenting complained that the standards supplied to the
Fisheries Board (standards substantially the same as those furnished
the Director under the law challenged in the Frasch case) were inadequate to support the delegation. The lack of unanimity in the earlier
cases is not reflected in the unanimous decision in the Frasch case,
however, and it would thus seem well established that in the area of
fishing regulation, the legislature can delegate extensive powers to
administrative agencies with a minimum statement of legislature policy
as the supporting standard.
Outside of the fisheries area, the controversy as to what constitutes
34 Ibid.
35 Note 31, supra. There is little effort in the cases to distinguish between delegation
of power to find a fact and delegation of power to promulgate rules and regulations. The
former is less open to attack than the latter on grounds of unconstitutional delegation
of law-making powers since the latter involves not only fact finding, but discretionary
rule making, which is more legislative in nature than is pure fact finding. Indeed most

of the cases talk not in terms of power to formulate rules, but in terms of power to
find facts upon which the law, as provided by the legislature, begins to operate. Under
a situation such as that involved in the Frasch case, the Director must (1) find that
fish are being depleted and (2) formulate rules and regulations designed to stop the
depletion.
36 City of Tacoma v. Peterson, 165 Wash. 461, 5 P.2d 1022 (1931). See WASH.
WORDS AND PHRASES.

3 120 Wash. 126, 135, 207 Pac. 15, 18 (1922), "By reason of the supposed good to be
accomplished in each particular instance, the courts have indeed more and more
departed from the firm foundation upon which representative government rests, and little
by little insiduously [sic] and imperceptibly, there has grown up a line of authorities,
which with slight exaggeration seems to warrant the views of the majority; and, unless
a halt be called, by the same growth continued representative government will be
wholly abolished."
-s Note 32, supra.
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a definite enough standard still divides the court." In Senior Citizens
League v. Department of Social Security," another case cited as
authority for the holding in the Frasch case, three dissenting justices
felt that despite a clear legislative attempt and intent to provide a
standard, the one furnished was inadequate. This was the majority
view in a case before the court a few months earlier, State v. Gilroy."
The differences between the cases, according to the majority opinion
in the Senior Citizens case, were these: (1) that the area regulated by
the law in the Senior Citizens case (social security) was a new and
very complex one, wherein many factors involved could not easily be
put before the legislature, and wherein a practical standard was
extremely difficult to formulate, while the area regulated in the Gilroy
case (operation of homes for children) was not a complex one, but one
in which the legislature could easily provide a workable standard; and
(2) that social security benefits are a boon from the state which
can be withdrawn completely if the legislature sees fit, while the
operation of children's homes, being a legitimate business and entirely
legal use of private property, represents an established right which
can be regulated by governmental agency control only when clear
and definite standards are provided for the agency exercising such
control.42 Inasmuch as the court cites the Senior Citizens case as
authority for its holding in the Frasch case, and does not mention the
Gilroy decision, although that decision was called to its attention,' it
seems a fair inference that the court feels that the right to engage in
fishing is a privilege granted by the state,44 and that the area of regulation of fishing is so complex that a workable standard is difficult to
formulate.
It should be noted that the argument of improper delegation of
39 In a case decided shortly after the Frasch case, State ex rel. Oregon State Highway Commission v. Yelle, 147 Wash. Dec. 725, 289 P.2d 1027 (1955), two dissenting
judges felt that power delegated to the Washington State Toll Bridge Authority
to set minimum toll rates on a bridge over the Columbia River based on cost of maintenance, operation, and bond interest was void as a delegation of legislative powers
without an adequate standard, although the standards in questions there were much
more definite than those involved in the Frasch case. Perhaps there is a distinction
between state owned roads and state owned fish. See note 44, infra.
4038 Wn2d 142, 228 P2d 478 (1951).
41 37 Wn.2d 41, 221 P.2d 549 (1950).
42 Cf. State ex rel. Makis v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 296, 193 Pac. 845, 12 A.L.R.
1248 (1920). The Maids case could be rationalized on similar grounds.
43 Brief for Appellant, p. 75.
44 State v. Tice, 69 Wash. 403, 125 Pac. 168 (1912), held that there is no private right
in a citizen to take fish or game except as such right is given by the state. This was
repeated in Vail v. Seaborg, 120 Wash. 126, 207 Pac. 15 (1922), wherein the court
said that the fish in the waters of the state are the property of the state. In the Frasch
case the court also upheld a property in fish caught outside the three mile limit.
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legislative powers formed only a small part of the attack on the constitutionality of Chapter 147, Laws of 1953 in Frasch v. Schoettler4 and
that the main arguments of the complainants revolved around considerations of due process, violation of the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution, and violation of restrictions in the Federal Constitution
against states laying imposts. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that
the court might declare similar delegations void, given a case which
raised only the issue of improper delegation of powers, and thus given
an opportunity to engage in a more complete analysis of the problem.
EuGENE

C. ANDERSON

"Daily Newspaper" Means Weekly Newspaper Putting Out a Daily Edition. In State
cx rel. Swan v Jones, 147 Wash. Dec. 645, 298 P.2d 982 (1955), a citizen of Vancouver
challenged the validity of an election held by that city under the terms of art. XI, § 10
of the Washington State Constitution, which section provides for adoption of a "homerule" charter by cities in which the population exceeds 20,000. The section requires
that notice of the election of adoption be published for thirty days preceding the election
in two daily newspapers published within the city adopting home rule. Since Vancouver
has only one such newspaper, the city contracted with a weekly newspaper published
in Vancouver to put out a daily edition for thirty days preceding the election. The
relator challenged that the weekly newspaper, with its daily editions, was not a
"daily newspaper" within the meaning of the constitutional provision. The supreme
court held that the term "daily newspaper" can and does include a weekly newspaper
published daily for a period necessary to comply with the terms of the provision
requiring notice to be published in a daily newspaper. Four dissenting justices argued
that the term "daily newspaper" meant just that, and if the requirement was offensive,
it should be removed by amendment, not by judicial legislation.
Survival of Statutory Right of Action After Statute is Repealed. Under RCW
424.100, persons injured by an intoxicated person were granted a right of action
against the person who gave or sold liquor resulting in the intoxication. The plaintiff
in Hanson v. Wfest Coast Wholesale Drug Co., 147 Wash. Dec. 744,289 P.2d 718 (1955)
sued in superior court to recover damages incurred as a result of collision between her
car and a car driven by a person who was intoxicated by liquor furnished by the
defendant at an annual Christmas party. Defendants demurred, claiming that the
statute applied only to sales, not gifts of liquor. The superior court sustained the
demurrer. Plaintiff appealed, but before the case could be heard, the statute granting
her a right of action was repealed. (Chapter 372, Laws of 1955). The supreme court
held that the case was moot. When the jurisdiction of a court to determine a case or
class of cases depends on a statute, jurisdiction ceases completely when the statute is
repealed. Prior to final judgment, there is no vested right. Ex Parte McArdle, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
Constitutional Debt Limit. Chapter 12, Laws of 1955 set up the Washington State
Building Finance Authority, which was to have the power to buy or lease lands,
build buildings thereon, and lease those buildings to state agencies. The program
45 46 Wn2d 281, 280 P.2d 1038 (1955).
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was to be financed by thirty year bonds, and the bonds were to be paid for by
building rents.

In State ex rel. Washington State Building Finance Authority v.

Yelle, 147 Wash. Dec. 632, 289 P.2d 355 (1955), the court held that the law was
unconstitutional because it exceeded the debt limit on state obligations placed by

art. VIII,

§ 1 of the Washington State Constitution. The court distinguished State

ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 195 Wash. 636, 82 P.2d 120 (1938),

and Gruen v. State Tax Commission, 35 Wn.2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949) on grounds
that the laws in those cases did not call for the debts to be paid from the general fund,

but from independent sources (bridge tolls, and cigarette excise taxes). The Building
Finance Authority law called for the bonds to be paid off by rentals from the buildings,
but the rent money was to come in large measure from the general funds, and thus,
said the court, the law is unconstitutional. Recognizing the law as an obvious attempt
to circumvent the constitutional debt limit, the court has indicated that the monies
which go to pay off bonds financing similar programs must not in any sense come
from the general funds, but must come from sources entirely independent, unless
the debt limit is increased by the method provided in the Constitution.

CONTRACTS
Offer and Acceptance-Waiver of Condition. In Simms v. Ervin'
the court held that an offeree could waive the mode of acceptance
specified in an offer and accept in a different manner. The offer was in
the form of a purchase order submitted to a Buick dealer by a prospective buyer. It requested delivery of a new Buick, specified the price,
terms for cash and time payment, and provided, "This order is not
binding upon you [seller] until accepted and signed by an executive of
your [seller's] company." The seller did not sign the purchase order,
but delivered a new Buick to the buyer and got him to sign a conditional sales contract. A few hours after delivery, the buyer called
the seller and informed him, "the deal was off." It was held that the
buyer did not withdraw in time because the conditional sales contract
had superseded the purchase order, or alternatively, because the seller
had waived the condition in the offer requiring written acceptance
and had accepted by making delivery. To support the rule that the
offeree could waive a condition in an offer the court relied on an earlier
Washington case, Pillsbury FlourMills v. Independent Bakery.' There
the same rationale was applied where a buyer submitted a purchase
order on the seller's printed form providing for delivery by installments
and written acceptance of the order to be sent to the buyer. The buyer
146 Wn.2d 417, 282 P.2d 291 (1955).
2 165 Wash. 360, 5 P.2d (1931). See also Lowenthal v. McCormack Bros., 144 Wash.

229, 257 Pac. 632 (1927), where the order required confirmation by the buyer and
delivery was made in full performance without prior confirmation by the buyer. The
court, rather oddly, held shipment by the seller constituted acceptance by him and the

subsequent receipt of delivery by the buyer, confirmation.

